The NAWA Awards Post #2 : Mar Roxas’ pics tell a thousand words and a million supporters

 

the composition of the picture is the winner here. you see Mar Roxas as the center of attention surrounded by selfie camera wielding fans and in the background a stadium full of Roxas supporters almost all of them wearing yellow, the official color of the Daang Matuwid campaign.

the picture at the same time talks about our time where cellphones and selfies are as common as the sun sets in the afternoon and rises in the morning. the cellphone and the selfie are truly ubiquitous among pinoys and even the world over.

for us to see that the whole stadium is full of people end to end, floor to roof tells us what this picture is all about and the time it was taken – it is election time!

when i saw this picture, i tweeted that this picture is of Getty Image quality. that is how Getty Images are. well, okay almost Getty Image quality. the picture has a technical flaw – it is out of focus in many parts. there are no Getty Images that are out of focus.

but wait, this was probably taken by a cellphone camera so we can forgive the out of focus technical flaw. nevertheless, this picture can win The NAWA Award.

 

Executive Summary BOI Full Report: The Mamasapano incident #SAF44

Full Text Of Executive Summary here :

Published below is the full text of the Executive Summary of the Philippine National Police Board of Inquiry Report on the Mamasapano clash, which claimed the lives of more than 60 people, including 44 members of the PNP’s elite Special Action Force. Click here for the full report.On January 25, 2015, sixty-seven (67) Filipinos died in Mamasapano, Maguindanao as a result of an encounter triggered by operation Plan (Oplan) Exodus.

The goal of Oplan Exodus was to neutralize high value targets (HVTs) who were international terrorists—i.e., Zkulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir (Marwan); Ahamad Akmad atabl Usman (Usman); and Amin Baco (Jihad).

Forty-four (44) members of the Special Aciton Force (SAF)—considered as the elite unit of the Philippine National Police (PNP) against terrorism and internal security threats-lost their lives in Mamasapano, while sixteen (16) other SAF members sustained severe injuries.

The tragic incident in Mamasapano raised several questions. How could a group of elite forces be massacred? Who was responsible for their deaths? What caused the traffic encounter in Mamasapano? Who were the hostile forces encountered by the SAF troops?

The Board of Inquiry (BOI) was created by the Philippine National Police (PNP) primarily to investigate the facts regarding Oplan Exodus and to provide recommendations in order to address such possible lapses.

The methodology used by the BOI in preparing this report is described in Chapter 1.

The BOI notes that the  information obtained from certain key personalities were limited. For instance the BI failed to secure a interview with the President Benigno Aquino III, suspended Chief PNP (CPNP) Alan Purisima, Chief-of-Staff AFP (CSAFP) General Gregorio Catapang, and Lieutenant General Rustico Guerrero. All concerned officers of the Armed Fores of the Philippines (AFP) refused to be interviewed by the BOI despite repeated requests.

The BOI did not have access to other crucial information such as contents of Short Messaging System (SMS) or text messages, and logs of calls and SMS. BOI’s requests for the submission of cellular phones for forensic examination were also denied by CSAFP Catapang, Guerrero, suspended CPNP Purisima and AFP officers. However, the sworn statement of suspended CPNP Purisima included a transcript of his SMS exchanges with the President on January 25, 2015.

Despite the foregoing limitations, the BOI succeeded in conducting several interviews, obtaining various types of evidence, processing and reviewing hundreds of  documents, and conducting ocular inspection in Mamasapano to produce this Report.

Based on the records, Oplan Exodus was approved by the President and implemented by suspended CPNP Purisima and the Director of SAF (Napeñas) Getulio Napeñas, to the exclusion of the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine National Police (OIC PNP) Leonardo Espina, who is the concurrent Deputy CPNP for Operations.

On December 16,2014, the OIC-PNP issued a Special Order No. 9851 which directed suspended CPNP Purisima and other suspended PNP officers, to “cease and desist from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of [their respective cases filed by the Ombudsman] until its termination.”

Napeñas and suspended CPNP Purisima ignored the established PNP Chain of Command by excluding OIC-PNP Espina in planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. Napeñas and suspended CPNP also failed to inform the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus, and made no prior coordination with the AFP. Based on the records. SILG and OIC-PNO were informed of Oplan Exodus through a phone call by suspended CPNP Purisima at 05:50 a.m. on January 25, 2015. SILG learned about the operation when he got an SMS from Police Director Charles Calima Jr. at 07:43 a.m. on January 2, 2015.

The participation of the suspended CPNP in Oplan Exodus was carried out with the knowledge of the President. Records revealed instances when the suspended CPNP met with the President and Napeñas to discuss Oplan Exodus on January 25, 2015.

Records also show that suspended CPNP Purisima failed to deliver his assurances to coordinate with the AFP. At a crucial stage of the crisis, the suspended CPNP Purisima provided inaccurate information from an unofficial source, which further jeopardized the situation of the 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne in Mamasapano.

There are indications that Napeñas may not have considered differing opinions raised by his subordinate commanders. The mission planning appears to have been done by a group of officers and not by a planning team, with inputs heavily influenced by Napeñas. Subordinate commanders expressed that Napeñas had unrealistic planning assumptions such as the swift delivery of artillery fire and the immediate facilitation of ceasefire.

Napeñas chose to employ a “way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only” infiltration and exfiltration Concept of Operation (CONOPS) for Oplan Exodus. During an interview with BOI, Napeñas admitted that he expected casualty of around ten (10) SAF Commandos to accomplish the mission.

Napeñas also admitted that key variables for the success of Oplan Exodus, such as the coordination with the Sixth Infantry Division (6ID), and with the Coordinating Committee o the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) were not thoroughly considered in the mission planning. The established protocols and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the AFP, CCCH and AHJAG in providing reinforcement and effecting ceasefire were not sufficiently discussed.

Napeñas proposed to the President the adoption of the time “Time-On-Target” (TOT) concept of coordination for Oplan Exodus. Application for the TOT concept restricted disclosure of information to a limited number of persons until the target is engaged. It appears that Napeñas’ primary consideration for adopting the TOT concept was operational security (OPSEC) to reduce the risk of having Oplan Exodus compromised.

The records show that when the President gave instructions to CPNP Purisima and Napeñas to coordinate with the AFP, Napeñas raised his concern that the AFP might be compromised due to intermarriages of some AFP personnel with the local people. He cited previous SAF operations against the same HVTs that were coordinated with the AFP. Suspended CPNP Purisima and Mendez shared the qualms of Napeñas.

When Napeñas proposed to the President the adoption of the TOT concept for Oplan Exodus, the President remained silent.

Police Superintendent Raymund Train of the 84 SAC (one of the survivor from the Mamasapano encounter) attested that, in case of heavy enemy fire, the first planned mitigating action for Oplan Exodus was indirect artillery fire support from the AFP. The second planned mitigating action was the commissioning of the peace process mechanisms to facilitate ceasefire.

However, Napeñas failed to consider the consequences of the TOT concept vis-a-vis the required mitigating actions. He appeared to have relied heavily on the verbal commitment  of the suspended CPNP Purisima to arrange for the needed AFP support. Coordination with the 6ID and CCCH and AHJAG was planned to be made at TOT, that was, upon engagement of the target. There was no plan for close air support.

With respect to the peace process mechanisms as mitigating actions in Oplan Exodus, the required coordination to trigger such mechanisms (such as a ceasefire) were not followed.

Prior communication with Brigadier General Carlito Galvez could have informed Napeñas that, in past experiences, a ceasefire could only be achieved after at least six (6) hours of negotiation.

By the time the AFP was informed about Oplan Exodus, a hostile encounter between the SAF Commandos and various armed groups in Mamasapano had already ensued.

Considering that the CONOPS adopted the way-in/way-out-in/way- that the CONOPS adopted heavy support from other SAF Commandos to secure the withdrawal route of the Main Effort (Seaborne). The plan was for the 84th Seaborne to link-up with 55th SAC and progressively with 4SAB units along the withdrawal route.

The delay in movement of the Seaborne affected the movement of the 4SAB and other reserve forces. When the containment and reserve forces arrived at the Vehicle Drop-off Point (VDOP), the situation in the area of operation was already hostile. Heavy sound of  gunfire were heard coming from the location of the 55th SAC. The troops immediately disembarked, organized themselves and rushed to their designed waypoints (WP). Midway between WP8 and WP9, the reinforcing troops came under heavy enemy fire. The exfiltration route became dominated by hostile forces. The Ground Comander at the Advance Command Post (ACP) was not able to maneuver the troops to break enemy lines and force their way to reinforce the 55th SAC Commandos near WP12. Ineffective communication system further exacerbated the situation.

During the site survey in Mamasapano on February 24, 2015, the BOI took note of the unfavorabe terrain faced by the reinforcing troops. The wide terrain between their location and that of the 55th SAC was literally flat without adequate cover and concealment. Tactical maneuvers, such as the “Bounding Overwatch” technique, would have been difficult and may result to more casualties. According to the platoon leaders, enemy fires were coming from all directions which prevented them from maneuvering and reinforcing 55th SAC.

In a joint interview with BOI, Mayor Ampatuan of Mamasapano and the Barangay Chairman and Officials of Tukanalipao in Mamasapno claimed that in the past, armed elements would readily withdraw from the encounter side whenever white phosphorus rounds were delivered by Field Artillery Batter of the 6ID PA.

In an interview with BOI, Napeñas claimed that the 6ID immediately provided artillery fire support when one of its infantry company was harassed by armed elements sometime in late November or early December 2014.

However, during the execution of Oplan Exodus, three (3) white phosphorous rounds were delivered late in the afternoon and not earlier in the morning when such rounds could have mattered most to the 84th Seaborne and the 55th SAC.

SAF coordinated and requested for indirect artillery fire support from the 1st Mechanized Brigade as early as 07:30 a.m. The Brigade Commander of the 1st Mech Brigade, Colonel Gener Del Rosario sought clearance for artillery fire from the 6ID Commander, Major General Edmundo Pangilinan. Howver, of the three recommendations given by Col. Del Rosario, only the dispatches of infantry support and mechanized support were approved by the MGEN Pangilinan. The request for indirect artillery fire was put on hold since, according to Pangilinan, they still lacked details as mandated by their protocol.

Based on the records, MGEN Pangilinan took it upon himself to withhold artillery fire support in consideration of the peace process and artillery fire protocols. However, pursuant to AA, PA SOP No. 4, that decision could have been made by a Brigade Commander like Col. Del Rosario.

The primary objective of Oplan Exodus to get the HVTs was not fully completed. Two of its targets, Jihad and Usman, were able to escape and remain at-large.

Three hundred ninety-two (392) SAF Commandos were mobilized for Oplan Exodus. Forty-four SAF members lost their lives in carrying out this mission. In discovering the facts that lead to such deaths, this Report stresses the importance of command responsibility: “A commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.”

FINDINGS:

1. Chain of Command

The Chain of Command in the PNP was violated. The President, the suspended CPNP Purisima and the former Director SAF Napeñas kept the information to themselves and deliberately failed to inform the OIC PNP and the SILG. The Chain of Command should be observed in running mission operations.

For instance, the Manual for PNP Fundamental Doctrine,¹ requires the Commander to discharge his responsibilities through a Chain of Command. Such Manual provides that it is only in urgent situations when intermediate commanders may be bypassed. in such instances, intermediate commanders should be notified of the context of the order as soon as possible by both the commander issuing the order and the commander receiving it.

With respect to Oplan Exodus, the Chain of Command in the PNP should have been: OIC, CPNP PDDG Espina (as senior commander) to Napeñas (as intermediate commander). PDG Purisima could not legally form part of the Chain of Command by reason of his suspension.

2. Command Responsibility

The principle of Command Responsibility demands that a commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do. Command Responsibility cannot be delegated or passed-on to other officers. Under the Manual of PNP Fundamental Doctrine, Command Responsibility “can never be delegated otherwise it would constitute an abdication of his role as a commander. He alone answers for the success or failure of his command in all circumstances.”

Based on all records, Napeñas admitted that he has command responsibility with respect to Oplan Exodus.

3. Coordination

The TOT coordination concept, which limits the disclosure of information to only a few personnel, is applicable only to ordinary police operations. This concept however does not conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP. Even AFP commanders asserted that the TOT concept is alien to the Armed Forces and runs counter to their established SOPs. Without coordination, following the AFP definition, support to operating units such as artillery or close air support is not possible since these entails preparations.

4. Operation Plan

Oplan Exodus was not approved by the OIC-PNP. Napeñas dominated the mission planning, disregarding inputs from his subordinate commanders on how the operation will be conducted. The concept of the way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only infiltration and exfiltration in an enemy controlled community with unrealistic assumptions was a high-risk type of operation.

5. Execution

Oplan Exodus can never be executed effectively because it was defective from the very beginning. Troop movement was mismanaged, troops failed to occupy their positions, there was a lack of effective communication among the operating troops, command and control was ineffective and foremost, there was no coordination with the AFP forces and peace mechanism entities (CCCH and AHJAG).

6. Command and Control

Command and control is critical to a coordinated and collaborative response to the Mamasapano incident. In Oplan Exodus, the SAF’s TCP and ACP were plagued by failures of command and control from the very start especially in the aspect of communication. As Oplan Exodus unfolded, mobile communication devices was used as a primary mode of communication. However, these devices fell short of what were needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command.

Radio Operators were assigned at the TCP one each for 84th Seaborne and 55th SAC. However, 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne lost contact during the crucial moments of executing Oplan Exodus. They had to rely on distinctive gunfire to approximate each other’s location. Radio net diagram was provided but failed when radio equipment bogged down.

7. Logistics

Some of the ordinance for M203 were defective. Although there were sufficient rounds of ammunition for each operating troop, the overwhelming strength of the enemy caused the troops to run out of ammunition. The common Motorola handheld radios failed when submerged in water because these were not designed for military-type of operations. The battery life was short because of wear and tear.

8. AFP Response

Artillery fire support was factored in as one of the mitigating actions of the SAF. However, such support was not delivered when needed. In consideration of the peace process, AFP did not deliver the artillery fire support under the consideration of the peace process, and on the absence of compliance with the required protocol. AFP demanded prior coordination to enable them to react and deliver the requested support. Nonetheless, the AFP sent infantry and mechanized units to reinforce the SAF. White phosphorus artillery rounds were fired late in the afternoon. However, by then, all of the 55th SAC lay dead except for one who was able to escape.

Local PNP units wer not fully utilized to reinforce the SAF. The reinforcement from the local and Regional PNP units were not seriously factored-in during the mission planning process.

9. Peace Process<echanisms< div=””>

Officials of the CCCH and AHJAG, when tapped by AFP, did their best to reinstate the ceasefire between the SAF and MILF combatants. The participation of other armed groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), private armed groups (PAGs), and other armed civilians in the firefight delayed the ceasefire.

10. United States (US) Involvement

The US was involved in the intelligence operations and medical evacuations. No US personnel/troops were involved in the actual combat operation. The US supported the operation by providing technical support to enhance monitoring of the troops on the ground.

They were also involved in the identification of Marwan through DNA analysis.

11. Post-Mission Actions

The report submitted by the PNP Crime Laboratory shows that around four (4) SAF commandos with fatal gunshot wounds (GSWs) to the head and at the mid-portion of the trunk were deathblows delivered by shooting at close-range. In other words, not all the forty-four (44) fatalities died during the actual firefight, but were literally executed at close-range by the enemy.

A total of 16 SAF firearms and one (1) cellphone were returned by the MILF. It was observed that some parts of the returned firearms had been replaced.

CONCLUSIONS:

Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. The President gave the go-signal and allowed the execution of Oplan Exodus after the concept of operations (CONOPS) was presented to him by Director of Special Action Force (SAF) Director Getulio Napeñas.

2. The President allowed the participation of the suspended Chief Philippine National Police (CPNP) Police Director General Alan Purisima in the planning and execution of the Oplan Exodus despite the suspension order of the Ombudsman.

3. The President exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeñas instead of Officer-in-Charge of the PNP (OIC-PNP) Police Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina. While the President has the prerogative to deal directly with any of his subordinates, the act of dealing with Napeñas instead of OIC-PNP Espina bypassed the established PNP Chain of Command. Under the Manual for PNP Fundamental Doctrine,² the Chain of Command runs upward and downward. Such Manual requires the commander to discharge his responsibilities through a Chain of Command.

4. The suspended CPNP Purisima violated the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman when he participated in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. He also violated the Special Order No. 9851 dated December 16, 2014 issued by OIC-PNP Espina, directing him and other suspended PNP officers to “cease and desists from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of the case until its termination.”

5. In the same meeting where the President instructed Napeñas and suspended CPNP Purisima to coordinate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),³ PDG Purisima thereafter said to Napeñas: “Ako na ang bahala kay Catapang.” The PNP Ethical Doctrine Manual cites, “Word of Honor — PNP members’ word is their bond. They stand by and commit to it.” The statement of Purisima may be construed as an assurance of providing the coordination instructed by the President.

6. Suspended CPNP Purisima provided inaccurate information to the President about the actual situation on the ground when he sent text messaged to the President stating that SAF Commandos were pulling out,⁴ and that they were supported by mechanized and artillery support.⁵

7. Despite his knowledge of the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, Napeñas followed the instructions of suspended CPNP Purisima not to inform OIC-PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus. This violated the PNP Chain of Command.

8. Napeñas failed to effectively supervise, control and direct personnel which resulted in heavy casualties of the SAF Commandos. Under the Manual on Fundamental Doctrines, Command Responsibility means that a commander is responsible for effectively supervising, controlling and directing his personnel. Under that same doctrine, a commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.

9. Napeñas followed his Time-on-Target (TOT) coordination concept despite the directive of the president to coordinate with the AFP prior to the operation.

10. The TOT coordination concept adopted by the SAF does not conform with the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP.

11. The protocols of the established peace process mechanisms, through the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), were not observed during the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus.

12. The mission planning of Oplan Exodus was defective due to: (1) poor analysis of the area of operation; (2) unrealistic assumptions; (3) poor intelligence estimate; (4) absence of abort criteria; (5) lack of flexibility in its CONOPS; (6) inappropriate application of TOT; and (7) absence of prior coordination with the AFP and AHJAG.

13. The following factors affected the execution of CONOPS: (1) mismanaged movement plan from staging area to Vehicle-Drop-Off Point (VDOP); (2) failure to occupy the designated way points; (3) ineffective communication system among the operating troops; (4) unfamiliarity with the terrain in the are of operation; (5) non-adherence to the operational/tactical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); (6) lack of situational awareness among commanders; and (6) breakdown in the command and control.

14. Artillery support from 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army (6ID-PA) was not delivered when needed most because Major General Edmundo Pangilinan, Division Commander of 6ID, considered the on-going peace process and protocols in the use of artillery.

15. The lack of situational awareness, limited cover and concealment, ineffective communication, and sustained enemy fire prevented the 1st Special Action Battalion (1SAB) and 4SAB containment forces from reinforcing the beleaguered 55th Special Action Company (SAC) troops.

16. CCCH and AHKJAG undertook all efforts to reinstate the ceasefire. “Pintakasi” and the loose command and control of the MILF leaders over their field forces contributed to the difficulty in reinstating ceasefire.

17. Some of the radios of the SAF Commandos were unreliable because these were not designed for military-type tactical operations. The batteries had poor power-retention capability due to wear-and-tear. Furthermore, SAF radios were not compatible with AFP radios for interoperability.

18. There was a breakdown of command and control at all levels due to ineffective and unreliable communication among and between the operating units.

19. There are indications that 55th SAC was not able to secure its perimeter, conduct reconnaissance, occupy vantage positions and establish observation posts.

20. Several rounds of ammunition of M203 grenade launchers were defective.

21. The United States involvement was limited to intelligence sharing and medical evacuation. Only SAF Commandos were involved in the actual combat operation of Oplan Exodus.

22. Autopsy reports indicate that four (4) SAF Commandos were shot at close-range while they were still alive. Records also indicate that possibility that some SAF Commandos were stripped-off their protective vests prior to being shot at close-range.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Based on this Report’s findings and conclusions, the Board of Inquiry (BOI) recommends the following:

1. Where the facts of this Report indicate possible violations of existing laws and regulations, appropriate government agencies should pursue the investigation of the Mamasapano incident to determind the criminal and/or administrative liabilities of relevant government officials, the MILF and other individuals.

2. The AFP and PNP, in coordination with OPAPP, should immediately review, clarify and strengthen the Join AFP/PNP Operational Guideline for Ad Hoc Joint Action Group especially in the area of coordination during Law Enforcement operations (LEO) against HVTs.

3. The AFP and PNP should jointly review related provisions of their respective written manuals and protocols to synchronize, reconcile and institutionalize inter-operability not only between these two agencies but also with other relevant government agencies. The National Crisis Management Core Manual (NCMC manual) could be one of the essential references.

4. Crisis management simulation exercises (similar to fire and earthquake drills) should be regularly conducted among key players including local government units particularly in conflict prone areas.

5. The PNP should review its Police Operational procedures to cover operations similar to Oplan Exodus and to clarify coordination issues.

7. The PNP should craft its own Mission planning Manual and institutionalize its application in PNP law enforcement operations.

8. The capabilities of SAF and other PNP Maneuver Units for Move, Shoot, Protect, Communicate and Close Air Support (CAS) should be enhanced.

9. The PNP should review its supply management system to ensure operational readiness of munitions and ordinance.

10. Cross-training between the PNP and the AFP pertaining to management and execution of military-type tactical operations should be institutionalized.

11. The PNP should immediately grant 1 rank promotion to all surviving members of the 84th Seaborne and PO2 Lalan for their heroism and gallantry in action, posthumous promotion to the fallen 44 SAF commandos, and should give appropriate recognition to all other participating elements.

More from: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/451797/news/nation/full-text-executive-summary-of-pnp-board-of-inquiry-report-on-mamasapano-clash

 

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MANILA, Philippines — The findings of the Philippine National Police’s Board of Inquiry (PNP-BOI) on the January 25 Mamasapano incident was made available online on Friday after it was submitted to Interior Secretary Manuel “Mar” Roxas II.

INQUIRER.net is re-posting the full report here:

Conclusions of the BOI report:

1. The President gave the go-signal and allowed the execution of Oplan Exodus after the concept of operations (CONOPS) was presented to him by Director of Special Action Force (SAF) Police Director Getulio Napeñas.

2. The President allowed the participation of the suspended Chief Philippine National Police (CPNP) Police Director General Alan Purisima in the planning and execution of the Oplan Exodus despite the suspension order of the Ombudsman.

3. The President exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeñas instead of Officer-in-Charge of the PNP (OIC-PNP) Police Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina. While the President has the prerogative to deal directly with any of his subordinates, the act of dealing with Napeñas instead of OIC-PNP Espina bypassed the established PNP Chain of Command. Under the Manual for PNP Fundamental Doctrine, the Chain of Command runs upward and downward. Such Manual requires the commander to discharge his responsibilities through a Chain of Command.

4. The suspended CPNP Purisima violated the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman when he participated in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. He also violated the Special Order No. 9851 dated December 16, 2014 issued by OIC-PNP Espina, directing him and other suspended PNP officers to “cease and desist from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of the case until its termination.”

5. In the same meeting where the President instructed Napeñas and suspended CPNP Purisima to coordinate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), PDG Purisima thereafter said to Napeñas: “Ako na ang bahala kay Catapang.” The PNP Ethical Doctrine Manual cites, “Word of Honor – PNP members’ word is their bond. They stand by and commit to it.” The statement of Purisima may be construed as an assurance of providing the coordination instructed by the President.

6. Suspended CPNP Purisima provided inaccurate information to the President about the actual situation on the ground when he sent text messages to the President stating that SAF Commandos were pulling out, and that they were supported by mechanized and artillery support.

7. Despite his knowledge of the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, Napeñas followed the instructions of suspended CPNP Purisima not to inform OIC-PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus. This violated the PNP Chain of Command.

8. Napeñas failed to effectively supervise, control and direct personnel, which resulted in heavy casualties of the SAF Commandos. Under the Manual on Fundamental Doctrines, Command Responsibility means that a commander is responsible for effectively supervising, controlling, and directing his personnel. Under the same doctrine, a commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.

9. Napeñas followed his Time-on-Target (TOT) coordination concept despite the directive of the President to coordinate with the AFP prior to the operation.

10. The TOT coordination concept adopted by the SAF does not conform with the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP.

11. The protocols of the established peace process mechanisms, through the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), were not observed during the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus.

12. The mission planning of Oplan Exodus was defective due to: (1) poor analysis of the area of operation; (2) unrealistic assumptions; (3) poor intelligence estimate; (4) absence of abort criteria; (5) lack of flexibility in its CONOPS; (6) inappropriate application of TOT; and (7) absence of prior coordination with the AFP and AHJAG.

13. The following factors affected the execution of CONOPS: (1) mismanaged movement plan from staging area to Vehicle-Drop-Off Point (VDOP); (2) failure to occupy the designated way points; (3) ineffective communication system among the operating troops; (4) unfamiliarity with the terrain in the area of operation; (5) non-adherence to operational/tactical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); (6) lack of situational awareness among commanders; and (6) breakdown in the command and control.

14. Artillery support from 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army (6ID-PA) was not delivered when needed most because Major General Edmundo Pangilinan, Division Commander of 6ID, considered the on-going peace process and protocols in the use of artillery.

15. The lack of situational awareness, limited cover and concealment, ineffective communication, and sustained enemy fire prevented the 1st Special Action Battalion (1SAB) and 4SAB containment forces from reinforcing the beleaguered 55th Special Action Company (SAC) troops.

16. CCCH and AHJAG undertook all efforts to reinstate the ceasefire. “Pintakasi” and the loose command and control of the MILF leaders over their field forces contributed to the difficulty in reinstating the ceasefire.

17. Some of the radios of the SAF Commandos were unreliable because these were not designed for military-type tactical operations. The batteries had poor power-retention capability due to wear-and-tear. Furthermore, SAF radios were not compatible with AFP radios for interoperability.

18. There was a breakdown of command and control at all levels due to ineffective and unreliable communication among and between the operating units.

19. There are indications that 55th SAC was not able to secure its perimeter, conduct reconnaissance, occupy vantage positions and establish observation posts.

20. Several rounds of ammunition of M203 grenade launchers were defective.

21. The United States involvement was limited to intelligence sharing and medical evacuation. Only SAF Commandos were involved in the actual combat operation of Oplan Exodus.

22. Autopsy reports indicate that four (4) SAF Commandos were shot at close-range while they were still alive. Records also indicate the possibility that some SAF Commandos were stripped-off their protective vests prior to being shot at close-range.

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/678685/full-report-the-mamasapano-incident#ixzz3UGakM7hG
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finally the real definition of “justice for SAF 44” gets into President Noynoy Aquino’s head

after several days, 2 speeches and 12+ hours of one-on-one meetings with the families of the slaughtered SAF 44, the real definition of “justice for SAF44” gets through the thick (dense), (totally) stubborn and (very) confused head of president noynoy aquino.

this is what we read in today’s PDI (read here : http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669544/aquino-orders-filing-of-raps-vs-milf-biff-butchers).

it is a breakthrough!

we intently listened to Aquino’s 2 speeches, we even read each one twice, one the Filipino as delivered speech and the other the English translation and we noticed as early as the first speech he delivered to the country via national TV was Aquino did not call for the arrest and prosecution of the MILF and BIFF killers of the SAF 44. in that first speech, it was not even pussy footing about it, it was plainly not in his speech. that national TV speech was i think 2 or 3 days after the SAF 44 slaughter.

after that national TV speech, Aquino was on silent mode again. then we heard he will be delivering another speech, a eulogy at the wake at the PNP headquarters in Manila for the slain SAF 44. we were hoping it will be in his speech.

we were disappointed. yes, Aquino mentioned “justice”,  he gave a strange and very wrong definition of “justice”. there he was facing the families of the slaughtered SAF 44 and the nation  and he defined ‘justice for SAF 44″ as “we will catch Usman”.

Aquino vows justice for SAF 44: ‘We will get Usman’
read here : http://www.rappler.com/nation/82423-aquino-justice-pnp-saf-44

FULL TEXT President Aquino’s eulogy for slain SAF men
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669163/full-text-president-aquinos-eulogy-for-slain-members-of-pnp-saf-in-mamasapano-maguindanao#ixzz3QSpJWGPF

[English] President Aquino’s speech addressing the nation on January 28, 2015
read : http://www.gov.ph/2015/01/28/english-president-aquinos-speech-addressing-the-nation-on-january-28-2015/

we have been calling out this wrong definition of “justice” by Aquino on twitter.

Aquino failure: defining "justice for #SAF44" as "capture Usman" when it shud be capture MILF & BIFF murderers according to rule of law.

— WAWAM (@wawam) January 31, 2015

so yesterday, Aquino finally got the true meaning of “justice for SAF 44”, the article at the PDI had this as the lead in on the article:

 

 

Finally, a tough stance from the Commander in Chief.

After being roundly criticized for not once coming out to condemn the Muslim rebels who massacred 44 police commandos in Mamasapano, Maguindanao province, last Sunday, President Benigno Aquino III has ordered Justice Secretary Leila de Lima to prepare criminal charges against those responsible for the carnage.

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669544/aquino-orders-filing-of-raps-vs-milf-biff-butchers#ixzz3QSsihSAi

took a few days to get through Noynoy Aquino's thick, stubborn & confused brain true meaning of "justice" #SAF44 pic.twitter.com/riusmiCpA8

— WAWAM (@wawam) February 1, 2015

that was the first time Aquino talked about putting to justice the killers of the SAF 44. we think that miracle happened after Aquino had his 12+ hour one-on-one talk with the families of the SAF 44. in another article at the PDI, it said there were two points that was said by the families of the SAF 44 : education concerns for the children of the slain SAF 44 and “justice”.  we suppose that hearing the word “justice” from 44 families over 12 hours finally got it through Aquino.

Aquino holds 12-hour dialogue with heroes’ kin

The quest for justice for their slain loved ones and ensuring the education of the children they left behind were the primary concerns of the families of the 44 Special Action Force (SAF) commandos who perished in the police operation against an international terrorist in Mamasapano town, Maguindanao province, a week ago.

—-

Common refrain: Justice

Although they did not ask for the specific details of the operation to get Marwan and local terrorist Basit Usman, Roxas said the families sought the President’s intervention in seeking justice for their slain loved ones.

“They asked for justice. They specifically mentioned the word ‘justice,’” he said. “There were one or two of them who questioned the need for the peace process.”

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669560/aquino-holds-12-hour-dialogue-with-heroes-kin#ixzz3QSu0A49t

during the 12+ hour meeting of Aquino with the slain  SAF  families, through twitter, we wondered and wished that there will be a policy change from Aquino’s standpoint on the slain SAF 44. we assumed that the point of having one-on-one meetings with the families had at last two main objectives : (1) for Aquino to express his personal condolence to the families and (2) for him to hear exactly what the sentiments of the families are.

knowing what the sentiments are will enable the government to retool its efforts and policies towards the SAF families and the whole event. i thought it was a great effort and the right thing to do. there is nothing better than the president himself talking face to face with the families. while we saw the meetings as admirable and the right thing to do, we were not sure if it will get the right result from the meeting. after all, noynoy aquino, the president of the country is known to have a very thick head (dense), is totally stubborn and often very confused about things.

I hope Aquino spending 12+ hrs w #SAF44 will result to policy & plan changes to govt stand & plans on the issue.

— WAWAM (@wawam) January 31, 2015

aside fr good PR, Aquino spending 12+ hrs of 1on1 w #SAF44 families means Aquino heard directly fr them what the families expect fr govt

— WAWAM (@wawam) January 31, 2015

Aquino spent 12+ hours on one on one convo w families of #SAF44, m hoping something good wil come out of it, like a change in policy.

— WAWAM (@wawam) January 31, 2015

we are happy that aquino finally got it. we should thank the families of the 44 SAF families that they told Aquino exactly what was on their minds.  while we kinda celebrate this, it worries us that for anything to get through to Aquino, it will need 12+ hours of non stop talking. but that point will be for another post.

we are trying very hard  not to take anything away from this. we congratulate Aquino for this turn around. let us hope that these will not be just words, that Aquino will show he truly gets it with concrete action.

 

the 6 unfinished businesses on the slaughtered 44 PNP SAF commandos that will make you scratch your head

 

the fallen 44 PNP SAF commandos

this is truly a shocking time for the Philippines – just a few days after the visit of Pope Francis to the country where 7 million went to Luneta to hear Pope Francis say mass and all 100 million of us were transformed and united  by the words of the pope and of God, we were shocked out of our wits by 44 faces of these young men of the PNP’s SAF unit who were all slaughtered in Maguindanao.

there should be some kind of irony that they died in the hands of the MILF and BIFF soldiers who we assume are Muslim and belong to the faith of Islam just a few days after the head of the Catholic faith was in the country  but we will not discuss that now. maybe for another day,

we sat in shock after more information were given on the incident that involved the 44 SAF personnel and how they died. we were brought into deeper shock when we heard the speeches delivered by government officials that listed what they will do and not do. from that shock, we are listing here things that we find and we put this mildly as unfinished businesses. and not putting it mildly, things that made us scratch our head.

in no particular order:

1. president aquino in his speeches defined ‘justice fpr the SAF 44″ as ‘the government will ctach Usman”, not as “catch the murderers of the 44 SAF men“. Usman is the other terrorist that the SAF was supposed to serve a warrant of arrest to.  the other one is international terrorist Marwan who according to the PNP was killed in the encounter.  Usman and Marwan were together, in separate huts but very near each other during the encounter.

we fail to see how catching Usman gives justice to the slaughtered 44 SAF men. the 44 SAF were slaughtered, they were murdered while doing their duties, the rule of law says murder is a crime in the Philippines and it is punishable. the president of the country not saying anything even remotely near that is at minimum disturbing and very disappointing.

we know that often times Noynoy Aquino has logic that only he understands but this one is one of the extremes. defining “justice” in that way seem to show he jumped several, actually many logic gaps that he did not bother to explain to us.

we are not even mentioning the fact that it took Aquino 3 days before he spoke about the massacre. he delivered 2 speeches on the matter and we listened intently to those two speeches. we listened as we wanted to hear from him that the government will pursue the killers. it was not mentioned in his first speech. it was also not mentioned in the second speech but it was there where he gave that strange definition of justice.

i scratched my head for the longest time on this one.

unlike president aquino, DOJ sec De Lima had made a statement that gives the proper definition of “justice for SAF 44”. De Lima shoulod be elected president! 

Justice Secretary Leila de Lima issued a statement assuring the families of the justice department’s commitment to pursue justice for the fallen Special Action Force men.

“But we need to first ascertain the full facts surrounding the whole incident, including the identification of perpetrators,” De Lima said.

She added: “We’re looking at criminal liabilities for various offenses, such as multiple murder, homicide, serious physical injuries, direct assault, illegal possession of firearms … obstruction of justice and others.”

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669344/chief-justice-sereno-kris-among-those-who-paid-their-last-respects#ixzz3QPEjn3ea
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook

 

Aquino failure: defining "justice for #SAF44" as "capture Usman" when it shud be capture MILF & BIFF murderers according to rule of law.

— WAWAM (@wawam) January 31, 2015

2. aquino seem to be giving the criminals among the MILF and BIFF a free pass on the crime they committed. it is ironic that the 44 SAF men died to uphold and execute the law and yet aquino seem to have given a free pass to those who broke the law and killed the 44 SAF men. justice, rule of law and even common sense were mangled to unrecognizable bits and pieces here.

3. according to news reports, 392 SAF men, a whole battalion was mobilized for the operation – how was it that the officers in the PNP chain of command didn’t know that a whole battalion of  men were being mobilized?  DILG chief  Mar Roxas and the PNP OIC both claim they did not know about the operation and these two gentlemen are part of the chain of command. the chain of command must have a long list of officers down the line but none of them noticed the mobilization or if they did, none of them reported the matter to higher ups?

the SAF men are stationed in many different parts of the country. to assemble 392 men in one place will mean small and big groups of men will be travelling from different places to go to one central location. aside from men preparing and leaving, equipment, arms and transport of all sorts would have been mobilized. surely, officers in the chain of command would have noticed the large amount of people and logistics are getting moved.

if the PNP chain of command did not notice the mobilization of 392 men, one battalion, it can mean the national government is susceptible to a coup detat and they will not even know  a battalion sized army with arms are already assembled and have commenced the attack on the government.

really, they did not know?

4. president Noynoy Aquino knew about the operation. aquino said he was told of the operation. it is not clear who was telling hin of the operation. the question here is this – why is a captain or even a major or colonel talking directly to the president? are we supposed to believe that? aquino as president knows by practice and i suppose in some handbook somewhere that men with the rank of general are the ones who have access to him. and these are not ordinary generals, they are usually 4-star or 5-star generals, the chiefs of the forces, not some middle level military or police officer. the military and the police are totally anal about procedure and the chain of command. protecting and upholding the chain of command is very critical in any military and police organization.

aquino says he knew about the operation, so what is this a captain or a major in the SAF who led the operation is a textmate of aquino? unlitext? or unlicall?

5. general Alan Purisima, the former PNP chief who has been suspended from office by the ombudsman was apparently in control of the operation and presdient Aquino knew it. we’re not questioning the skills and knowledge of Purisima but why was he actively involved and in fact the lead in this operation when getting suspended means he is not supposed to perform the function that he was supposed to be performing?  in simple terms, a suspension means “you do not perform your function” but that was violated here. since he performed his function contrary to the order of the ombudsman, is Purisima now liable to be jailed?

the other head scratching moment here is that president aquino was a party here. Aquino admitted he was talking to Purisima about  the SAF operation. in other words, the president was a party in violating the suspension order of the ombudsman.

6. terrorists Usman and Marwan have been in the MILF territory apparently for years – the MILF has been coddling international terrorists?  it is not like these two just dropped by at the MILF territory. they had houses in the area. their wives and family were there too. the MILF know who they were and they allowed them to stay in their territory without reporting it to the police or the army. the MILF coddled and harbored the international terrorists. they are bomb makers and they have killed a lot of people in Mindanao and in the case of Marwan also in Bali, Indonesia.

we are not a lawyer. we do not claim any knowledge of the law. and we are not looking at these items from the point of view of the law but just from the eyes of a citizen using common sense. none of these things can be explained by anything close to common sense.

3 survey charts that tell VP Binay his 2016 presidential ambition may be over

these charts have been published before and their analysis have been made, posted here : http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/.

but we like to post them again here to give them some focus and highlight their meaning. the meaning? it is bleak for VP Binay. the meaning from these 3 charts is simple : VP Binay’s 2016 presidential ambition may be over.

 

VP Jejo Binay’s presidentiables survey results :

• there is bad news all over the chart – all his ratings in September versus previous survey in June are down –  across the board and dramatic drops, statistically significant, in most cases double digit numbers
• drops like those are very serious – supporters from all segments and locations are dropping  binay, hordes of them
• those results are on themselves pretty bad, but that is not worst of it
• much bigger problems are the ones encircled – the ABC and D socio-ecco classes ratings comparing them to march 2014. the drops here are a nightmare.
• among the ABC socio-eco class, more than half, yes more than half fell off from march : to 23% in september from 47%, a whopping 24% points dramatic decline or a 51% shrinkage. imagine, the upper class or thinking class, more than half of them dropped binay. those are worrying numbers!
• next is the D socio-eco class – a drop to 32% from 42% in march or another dramatic decline of -10% points, or 24% of them abandoned Binay.
• take those 2 declines and your conclusion is that the political base of binay has shrunk considerably.
• more bad news – this survey was the first survey conducted while the corruption charges were being made and not only that they were made at just the start of the hearings in the senate. many more corruption charges have been uncovered, talked about and in the headlines since the early days. now think what the survey numbers will be when they conduct the next survey. another double digit decline maybe? and that could be saying it nicely

one of the spins binay’s spokespersons said on these numbers were that his ratings are still the highest among the presidentiables. yes, that is true but that is being selective and shows a clear ignorance on election polls.

yes, binay’s ratings are the highest but they are declining. and the declines are dramatic. in polls like these where several are taken on regular time intervals across a period of time until election time, what is more important is the trend and much less the numbers per se, time sensitive polls like this may show you to be up now but over the next survey points, the numbers will change and if your numbers are on a declining trend, then you have a problem because by the time you reach election time, you might no longer have the numbers to win the election.

the scariest question that binay needs to answer is this – is the latest surveys the beginning of a declining trend for binay?

there are 6 quarters to go until election time and therefore 6 more polling data. his ratings may be 31% now and the highest among the presidentiables, if it is on a declining trend, that will not remain as 31% after 6 quarters. all it takes is that his ratings drop by an average of 5% points per quarter and by election time, all that he will have will be 1%. having a 1% rating by election time will NOT make you win the election.

the first chart shown here is just about binay himself. but an election is not just about one person. an election is one where there are opposing candidates. among his opposing candidates, mar roxas, an aquino ally is considered a good if not strong contender and opponent of binay, the above are mar roxas’ charts and it should scare the hell out of binay.

• preference for roxas as president are all dramatically up – across the board in all areas and all socio-eco classes.
• not only are the increases statistically significant, many of them are like double to triple the numbers in september versus june and march.
• the dramatic increases are also shown in the rankings of the presidentiables – mar roxas jumped from 5th place in june to now 2nd place in september
• that means roxas is gaining at the expense of binay – binay’s supporters are choosing roxas
• add to that the fact that the campaign period has not begun and roxas is essentially just staying in the sidelines. sure, roxas is often seen all over the country doing his job as DILG but he is not openly campaigning.
• in other words, roxas is gaining supporters for doing nothing, just on the blunders that binay is committing one after the other. roxas stands to gain much more once the campaign period starts as he can now actively get supporters to his camp. when roxas starts doing that, binay’s supporter base may shrink even more.

caveat : with the election stll 6 quarters away, these numbers will of course change. and importantly anything can happen from now till the 2016 election – the candidates themselves may change, their strategies and national events may occur that will change the minds of voters. but what we are saying here is that if everything else is equal and binay does not change his strategies and tactics – he can kiss his presidential ambitions good bye.

the numbers do not lie, they are all there. binay would have wished he had not lied himself…

post your Goodbye Message to gloria and your Hello Message To Noynoy here

we are counting just days before gloria macapagal arroyo leaves office and noynoy aquino takes over. here is a place where you can tell gloria what you feel and think as she leaves the presidency and as noynoy takes office.

click  here: http://goodbyegloriahellonoynoy.wordpress.com/

online exit poll now open – tell us who you voted for president and vice-president

click here to cast your vote on the 2010 exit poll. tell us who you voted for president and vice-president. then find out who among the candidates are leading in todays election —> http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/

find out if you are a registered voter and your precint number

try this out,  confirm if you are a registered voter and find your precint number, click here: http://www.comelec.gov.ph/precinctfinder/precinctfinder.aspx

get out and vote for aquino and roxas

siguraduhing ipanalo sina aquino at roxas  – bumoto sa may 10.

senator nene pimentel turns the senate into a hall of shame and dishonor

we think senator nene pimentel’s behavior on the senate floor is one of the most disgusting words uttered in that august place.  (read more about it here: senator nene pimentel dives into a pool of shame and dishonor with “insertion” remark towards mar roxas, takes the senate with him)

The debate took a turn for the worse when Pimentel used the same word to comment on Sen. Mar Roxas’ defense that he, too, had no insertion in the national budget.

“After your marriage, you will have your insertions,” quipped Pimentel, a rather unsavory remark that drew Roxas’ ire.

“I demand that that be removed from the record!” shouted Roxas. “This is an affront to my wife.”

Roxas was recently married to broadcast journalist Korina Sanchez.

“Then remove it immediately,” retorted Pimentel.

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100126-249466/Trash-talk-mars-august-chamber-debate

edu manzano is gilbert teodoro’s VP, mar roxas takes commanding lead in 2010 Vice Presidentiables Poll

click here to vote in the vice-presidentiables poll –>  mar roxas takes commanding lead at 43% in 2010 Vice-Presidentiable Poll

the long wait is over – at last someone has agreed to be gilbert teodoro’s VP runningmate – edu manzano. manzano is more know for being an actor/tv show host and the ex-husband of vilma santos. he used to be vice mayor of makati but his most recent government role is as chair of the Optical Media Board. we see him around town raiding stalls of pirated CDs and computer software.

read in full here: finally someone agrees to be gilbert teodoro’s VP running mate – edu manzano

mar roxas dominates SWS VP poll – aquino-roxas tandem formidable, weakens gilbert teodoro

mar roxas getting a 40% in the 3rd qtr VP poll puts him at a dominant leadership position just like his partner noynoy aquino. this puts their tandem at a very steep leadership position.

it also shows roxas has recovered and rebuilt his image coming from the “putang-ina” incident. what redeemed him was his words and behavior when noynoy spent a few weeks figuring out if he will run for president or not. roxas withdrawing his own bid for the presidency and the way he did it was excellent statesmanship.

read in full here: http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/2009/10/26/sws-septemmber-vice-presidential-poll-mar-roxas-dominates-the-aquino-roxas-tandem-formidable-puts-one-more-nail-on-teodoros-candidacy/

sharon cuneta to campaign for noynoy & mar – a mega development!

this is a major development and pledge. it’s strong enough that kris  aquino and korina sanchez are there to campaign for the aquino-roxas tandem, adding megastar sharon cuneta to the list is, well pretty mega.

the aquino-roxas tandem has the potential to bring in a very wide crowd to their cause. they will not only attract people from across the board, they will more importantly attract the young.

read in full here: http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/2009/09/21/megastar-sharon-cuneta-to-campaign-for-aquino-roxas/

breaking news – mar roxas gives up presidential bid to support noynoy for president

in a news conference that just ended (6:45 pm manila time) as this is being written, – senator mar roxas announces he is abandoning his presidentiable bid. senator roxas says he is supporting noynoy aquino’s presidential bid.

noynoy aquino has not announced if he will run for president. a news conference by noynoy aquino will be held tomorrow.

Roxas gives up presidential bid
By Maila Ager
INQUIRER.net
First Posted 18:31:00 09/01/2009

MANILA, Philippines – Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas is no longer running for president in 2010. The Senator himself announced this at the press conference on Tuesday.

Roxas has not yet officially declared his presidential bid but some of his colleagues in the Liberal Party have publicly endorsed his candidacy.

Roxas’ decision came amid the increasing clamor for Senator Benigno “Nonoy” Aquino III to continue the legacy of his parents – the late president Corazon “Cory” Aquino and martyred senator Benigno Aquino Jr. – by running for a higher post.

Senator Aquino has yet to decide whether or not to run for president or vice president.

Present at the press conference were LP officials: Chairman Emeritus Jovito Salonga, secretary general Neric Acosta, spokesman Erin Tañada; and other party members like Congressmen Rufino Biazon and Antonio Abaya; former Civil Service Commission chief Karina David, former social welfare secretary Corazon “Dinky” Soliman, and former defense secretary Avelino Cruz.

Also seen was Roxas’ mother, Judy Araneta-Roxas.

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view/20090901-223047/Roxas-gives-up-presidential-bid

escudero at risk; de castro poised to dominate; roxas got it wrong – May 2009 Pulse Asia Presidentiables Survey

surveys can give a lot of good insights. interpreted properly, any of the presidentiables can sharpen and reshape their plans to build on their strengths or correct weaknesses.

read in full here: http://bit.ly/wp3Wj

Memo To: Mar Roxas, Love & Marriage As Marketing Strategy

you are a senator, your GF is a popular TV journalist and you want to get married. that amounts to you do not have a choice – anything and everything you do is a marketing tool or a marketing bane.

since you have a choice, why not make love & marriage as a marketing tool.

that is what mar roxas did when he announced his engagement to korina sanchez. not that he had a choice but this marketing strategy we thought was not used to its best potential.

read in full here: http://tinyurl.com/ppz5ta

“padyakitos” tv ad – mar roxas pedals to advertising mediocrity

mar roxas trying to be cute in new tv ad

mar roxas, a presidentiable has a new tv ad – “payakitos”. don’t look at me, we did not invent the term “padyakitos”, it’s the title of the tv ad that most likely the admen coined to refer to the young child who is working on the “padyak”, the trycicle manually run.  

that’s an obvious attempt to be cute and that is the beginning of this ad getting mar roxas to pedal to political mediocrity.

that is next at: http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/ view the tv ad in the same link.

mar roxas, senator “putang ina”, presidentiable

bush had his defining moment recently. senator mar roxas did, too. but president bush came out much better than mar roxas did.

unless the senator does something to undo it, he runs the risk of  being known as senator putang ina, presidentiable.

read about it here: http://2010presidentiables.wordpress.com/